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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Daniel Clark appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence
discovered after a police officer, without a warrant and without consent, opened the door to his
home’s garage. The district court held the officer’s intrusion was justified under the “emergency
aid exception” to the warrant requirement. The officer had intended to conduct a “welfare
check” after a neighbor reported hearing “loud crying from a female and baby” the night before,
and seeing property items strewn in the driveway that morning. At noon, when the officer
arrived, the house was silent and there was no response when he knocked on the front door. The
officer walked over to the attached garage and just opened it.
Mr. Clark claims that these facts do not support a reasonable belief there was a person
inside the home who needed emergency medical aid or was in imminent danger of harm, and that
the officer’s warrantless intrusion into his home violated the Fourth Amendment. The district
court’s conclusions to the contrary are erroneous and the denial of Mr. Clark’s motion to
suppress should be reversed.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State asserts that Mr. Clark waived his right to appeal the
denial of his suppression motion because his guilty plea was not a conditional plea entered in
compliance with I.C.R. 11(a)(2). This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s waiver
argument and to demonstrate that Mr. Clark entered a conditional guilty plea that complies with
Criminal Rule 11(a)(2).
Mr. Clark additionally addresses the States incorrect assertion that the police reports not
offered or admitted into evidence can be considered by this Court as “substantial evidence” in
support of the district court’s findings.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Clark’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Clark’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Clark’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Mr. Clark Entered A Conditional Guilty Plea That Complies With Criminal Rule 11(a)(2)
Mr. Clark entered a conditional guilty plea reserving his right to appeal the district

court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Contrary to the assertion by the State (Respondent’s
Brief, pp.6-11), Mr. Clark’s guilty plea was conditionally entered in compliance with Criminal
Rule 11(a)(2). That Rule provides:
With the [1] approval of the court and [2] consent of the prosecuting attorney, a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, [3] reserving in writing the right,
on appeal from the judgment, to review [4] any specified adverse ruling. If the
defendant prevails on appeal, the defendant must be allowed to withdraw
defendant’s plea.
I.C.R. 11(a)(2).
Additionally, when considering the terms of a plea agreement, the appellate courts
consider contractual terms that are implied by the plea agreement as well as those expressly
provided. State v. Jefek, 141 Idaho 71, 73 (2003). “[W]here the language of that plea agreement
is ambiguous, those ambiguities shall be resolved in favor of the defendant.” State v. Gomez,
153 Idaho 253, 258 (2012).

1.

Mr. Clark’s Conditional Plea Was Entered With The Approval Of The Court

As the State acknowledges (Resp.Br., p.8), the district court initially accepted Mr. Clark’s
guilty plea conditionally, pending the completion and review of the Guilty Plea Advisory Form,
stating:
At this point, I will conditionally find that the defendant’s plea is knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently made and accept the defendant’s guilty plea
conditioned on the later review of the Guilty Plea Advisory Form that I assume
will be prepared for review by the sentencing judge.
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(11/16/17 Tr., p.58, Ls.5-10) (emphasis added).1
Mr. Clark prepared and filed a Guilty Plea Advisory Form indicating that his guilty plea
was “a conditional guilty plea” in which he was “reserving [his] right to appeal any pre-trial
issues.” (R., p.114, para.21.) The sentencing court imposed the judgment of conviction based on
Mr. Clark’s guilty plea without first making explicit findings or rulings regarding the validity of
Mr. Clark’s guilty plea. (See generally 12/14/17 Tr., p.60, L.4 – p.70, L.2.) However, there is a
“presumption of regularity” that attaches to the actions of the district court. See State v. Wolfe,
158 Idaho 55, 61 (2015).2

Because the district court’s finding of a valid guilty plea was

explicitly conditioned on the subsequent review of the Guilty Plea Advisory Form, there is a
presumption that the sentencing court reviewed the form and approved of entry of the conditional
guilty plea indicated therein, before it imposed judgment. To hold otherwise, as urged by the
State (Resp.Br., p.10), would be to hold that the district court imposed the judgment of
conviction based on an unknowing, and therefore invalid guilty plea, and is incompatible with
the presumption of regularity.

1

Although the judge who took Mr. Clark’s guilty plea (Hon. Judge Carey) was not the same
judge who later sentenced Mr. Clark, the Court Minutes – which would have been available to
the sentencing judge (Hon. Judge Ryan) – detailed the fact that that guilty plea was accepted
conditionally, pending the sentencing judge’s review of the forthcoming Guilty Plea Advisory
Form. (R., p.104.)
2
In Wolfe, the question was whether the district court had considered the defendant’s Rule 35
motion. 158 Idaho at 61. The Idaho Supreme Court held that “the issue was before the district
court and this Court applies a presumption of regularity and validity to judgments.” See Burge v.
State, 90 Idaho 473, 478 (1966); State v. Mason, 102 Idaho 866, 869 (1982) (holding a
presumption of regularity attaches to the trial court’s actions); State v. Mundell, 66 Idaho 297,
304, 316 (1945) (stating that in the absence of any positive showing as to what actually occurred,
a presumption must be indulged in favor of the trial court’s action, and that “[a]s a general rule
the appellate court, in the absence of a showing in the record to the contrary, will indulge all
reasonable presumptions in favor of the correctness of the judgment or rulings of the trial court,
and will presume that the proceedings had in the progress of the cause were regular and free
from error.”); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992) (recognizing that there is a
presumption of regularity that attaches to final judgments from state court proceedings).
5

2.

Mr. Clark’s Conditional Plea Was Entered With The Consent Of The Prosecutor

Mr. Clark also entered his conditional guilty plea with the consent of the prosecuting
attorney. The same prosecutor, Canyon County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Doug Robertson,
was present at both the plea hearing (see R., p.102; 11/16/17 Tr., p.58, L.20) and the sentencing
hearings (see R., p.106; 12/14/17 Tr., p.60, L.20). Thus, the prosecuting attorney was plainly on
notice that the district court’s finding of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea, and its
acceptance of that plea, was made expressly conditional on the forthcoming Guilty Plea
Advisory Form. (See generally 11/16/16Tr., p.58, Ls.4-7.) Given the significance of the Guilty
Plea Advisory Form in this case, if the prosecutor believed Mr. Clark’s guilty plea was not
conditional as represented, the prosecutor had an affirmative duty to dispute or clarify the
statement at that time; the prosecutor was not entitled to remain silent. See State Peterson, 148
Idaho 593, 597 (2009). In Peterson, defense counsel made a clarifying statement to the district
court regarding the parties’ plea agreement, and the prosecutor stood silent. Id. The Court
explained:
Based upon the facts of this case, where both the prosecution and defense have
assented to entry of the plea agreement, and where, immediately following the
court’s acceptance of the plea agreement, defense counsel proffers a description
of the scope of the plea agreement, said description differing from what the
prosecutor understands the agreement to encompass, the prosecutor has an
affirmative duty to dispute the defendant’s representation of the scope of the plea
agreement, or to ask for further time to clarify the agreement. Otherwise silence
shall be interpreted as acceptance of the stated terms.
148 Idaho at 597, 226 P.3d at 539.

See also State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 498

(Ct. App. 2012).
As in Peterson, if the prosecutor here believed that Mr. Clark’s representation that he was
entering a conditional guilty plea did not reflect the parties’ agreement, then the prosecutor was
obliged to dispute Mr. Clark’s representation. As in Peterson, the prosecutor’s silence in the
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face of Mr. Clark’s representation that his plea was being conditionally entered should be
interpreted as acceptance, i.e., as consent.
3.

Mr. Clark’s Reservation Of His Right To Appeal Was In Writing

Mr. Clark’s reservation of his right to appeal is set forth in writing in his Guilty Plea
Advisory Form. As discussed above, the district court conditioned its acceptance of Mr. Clark’s
guilty plea on the completion and review of his Guilty Plea Advisory Form. (11/16/17 Tr., p.58,
Ls.4-16.) That form, filed in accordance with the district court’s instructions, indicates in writing
that Mr. Clark’s plea “is a conditional guilty plea” and that he is “reserving [his] right to appeal
any pre-trial issues.” (R., p.114, para.21.)
4.

This Court Can Determine From The Record That The Denial Of Mr. Clark’s
Suppression Motion Is The Adverse Ruling Reserved For Appeal

Regarding Rule 11(a)(2)’s provision for reserving any “specified adverse ruling, the
Idaho Supreme Court has stated that a conditional plea agreement should explicitly set forth the
adverse ruling(s) below which is being reserved for appeal.” State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho
410, 423 (2012) (emphasis added). The Court went on to state,
That said, where a conditional plea agreement itself lacks such specificity, Idaho
appellate courts will review the record in an attempt to determine what the
conditional plea agreement reserves for appeal.
Id. See also State v. Anderson, 129 Idaho 763 Idaho 764 (1997) (“This Court will sustain an
appeal under Rule 11(a)(2) if we can determine the nature of the appeal and the right reserved for
the appeal with specificity from the record.”)
Mr. Clark acknowledges that his conditional plea did not specify that he was reserving
his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. (See generally R., p.114, para.21.)
However, this Court can determine from its review of the record that the denial of the
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suppression motion is the adverse ruling reserved. The suppression issue was the pre-trial issue
litigated in this case. (See generally, R.) It was the motion briefed by both parties, and the only
motion for which the district court issued a formal, written order containing findings,
conclusions, and an analysis. (R., pp.93-100.) Most importantly, it was the only potentially
dispositive motion Mr. Clark made in this case, and the district court’s ruling on that motion is
the only adverse ruling which, if overturned on appeal, would entitle Mr. Clark to withdraw his
guilty plea. (See generally, R.) Moreover, to the extent it reflects the parties’ understanding of
the issue reserved, the Notice of Appeal designates the Fourth Amendment violation as the issue
to be raised on appeal. (R., pp.138-40.)
Certainly, it would have been preferable for Mr. Clark to have followed this Court’s “best
practice” by explicitly stating the suppression ruling as the ruling reserved. See id. However,
this Court can and should determine from the record that the adverse ruling Mr. Clark reserved is
the denial of his motion to suppress.
B.

Because The Police Reports Were Not Offered Or Admitted As Evidence At The
Suppression Hearing They Cannot Provide “Substantial Evidence” In Support Of The
District Court’s Findings
The State and Mr. Clark disagree over whether Officer Crupper’s police report can be

considered as “evidence” in support of the district court’s decision. (Appellant’s Brief, p.16;
Resp. Br., pp.16-17.) The report was never offered or admitted as evidence at the evidentiary
hearing held on the suppression motion. (See generally, 8/14/17 Tr., p.1, L.3 – p.50, L.3.) The
State submits that because the report was filed in connection with Mr. Clark’s suppression
motion, the district court could rely on it as evidence in support its factual findings.
(Resp.Br., pp.16-17.) Mr. Clark submits that the State’s position is incorrect.
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Because this was a warrantless search of a residence, the State bore the heavy burden to
demonstrate that the facts known to the officer at the time of that search justified entry into the
residence. See State v. Araiza, 147 Idaho 371, 374-75 (Ct. App. 2009). In order for this Court to
uphold the district court’s conclusion that the State met that burden, the district court’s
underlying factual findings must be supported by “substantial evidence.” State v. Henage, 143
Idaho 655, 659 (2007).
By filing the police reports along with his motion to suppress, Mr. Clark was complying
with his duty under Criminal Rule 12(c), to “describe the evidence sought to be suppressed and
the legal basis for its suppression sufficiently to give the opposing party reasonable notice of the
issues.” However, neither he nor the State offered the reports as “evidence” at the suppression
hearing, and neither of the police reports was admitted as evidence by the district court. (See
generally, 8/14/17 Tr., p.1, L.3 – p.50, L.3.)
Because the police reports were not offered or admitted as evidence, they cannot provide
“substantial evidence” to support the district court’s findings. See Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho
933, 936 (Ct. App. 2005) (“Unless introduced into evidence, pleadings [including sworn
affidavits attached thereto] are not evidence”); Singh v. INS, 213 F.3d 1050, 1054 n.8 (9th Cir.
2000) (“[S]tatements in motions are not evidence and are therefore not entitled to evidentiary
weight.”)
In any event, even if the reports had been admitted by the district court, and Officer
Crupper was aware of a prior contact with the residence on May 2, the facts in this case are still
insufficient, as a matter of law, to support a reasonable belief that a person inside the home was
in need of emergency medical assistance or in imminent danger of harm. For the reasons set
forth in the Appellant’s Brief, Officer Crupper’s act of opening Mr. Clark’s garage door, and
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exposing that protected space to the officer’s view, was an unreasonable intrusion and violated
Mr. Clark’s constitutional rights. The district court’s order denying suppression should be
reversed.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Clark respectfully asks
this Court to reverse the district court’s denial of his suppression motion, to vacate his judgment
of conviction, and to remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 25th day of February, 2019.

/s/ Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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/s/ Evan A. Smith
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